The $2 Trillion Global Arms Race
发布时间 来源
Episode 设置
以下是这段内容的中文翻译：
彭博社由Stephanie Flanders主持的“特朗普经济学”播客最新一期节目，深入探讨了在不断变化的全球地缘政治动态和技术进步推动下，日益升级的全球军备竞赛。节目邀请了国防专家、彭博经济的Becca Wasser和彭博新闻全球国防编辑Gerry Doyle，讨论强调了唐纳德·特朗普对北约施加的压力以及乌克兰冲突，正在如何重塑全球国防开支和优先事项。
播客以包括唐纳德·特朗普在内的北约领导人在土耳其举行会议为背景开场。这些峰会的一个关键焦点，尤其是在特朗普执政期间，一直都是美国“合理的论调”，即欧洲国家需要增加国防开支，以应对边境风险，并减少对美国安全保障的依赖。这种压力，加上俄罗斯入侵乌克兰，共同催生了全球军事投资的激增，标志着一场与冷战时期显著不同的新军备竞赛。
Gerry Doyle解释说，增加国防开支的紧迫性，最初侧重于坦克、飞机和火炮等传统战场资产，如今已经演变。当前的竞赛不再关乎核弹当量，而更多是通过下一代技术获得微妙优势。这些技术包括用于进攻、防御和侦察的无人机；旨在保护卫星和增强军事能力的空间军事化；以及能够以极高速度机动以规避防御的高超音速武器。乌克兰和伊朗的持续冲突已经展示了无人机和人工智能在战场上的实际应用和变革力量。
Becca Wasser补充说，这种技术追求旨在实现三大优势：
1. **决策优势：** 谁能通过人工智能技术更快地做出决策。
2. **规模优势：** 谁能部署更多资产，如低成本无人机和导弹，以压倒对手。
3. **成本效益：** 以最低的开支获得最佳效果，这通常会促使人力或财政受限的国家大量投资于无人机和人工智能。
然而，专家们警告说，虽然无人机提供了“物超所值”的效果，但它们并非万能。社交媒体常常扭曲其有效性，只展示成功的打击，却不披露大量失败的尝试或目标预先存在的弱点。它们是一种补充工具，而非高端武器的完全替代品。
讨论触及了一个看似矛盾的现象：无人机被视为廉价且能够拉平力量的技术，然而整体军备竞赛却涉及巨大、尖端且昂贵的研发。Gerry指出，尽管无人机和人工智能能让资源有限的小国以更低的成本获得80%的高端能力，但像美国和中国这样财力雄厚的国家，在更大规模的生产、研发以及将这些新技术与现有先进系统结合的能力方面，仍然拥有优势。
量化开支，仅美国国防预算请求就达1.5万亿美元，约占其GDP的3.4%——低于冷战高峰时期，但显著高于近年来。欧洲也设定了到2030年或2035年将国防开支提升至GDP的3.5%的目标，但目前的预测表明，许多国家将无法达到这一目标，通常是通过承担巨额债务来实现。全球范围内，这一数字约为2万亿美元。
关于经济影响，共识是国防开支在就业和制造业方面的经济红利，通常低于其他类型的基础设施投资。对于欧洲而言，发展本土国防产业至关重要，以避免仅仅依赖进口美国硬件。然而，欧洲的国防工业高度分散，各国都优先支持自己的“国家冠军企业”。对于发展天基基础设施、防空系统和运输机等战略资产而言，集体行动和协调至关重要，但政治现实使得“选择赢家和输家”变得困难，因为每个国家都希望国防开支能惠及本地经济。
政府与科技部门（尤其是在人工智能领域）的融合也得到了讨论。中国的“军民融合”方针使其在将技术突破转化为军事应用方面具有优势，这与西方国家分散的决策模式不同。尽管人工智能可以提供优化物流等良性应用，但对其用于加速目标识别过程（如伊朗战争中Palantir的Maven系统所示）以及，最关键的是，其可能融入核指挥与控制系统中的担忧日益加剧。Becca强调在这些关键领域需要人类决策，尽管一些安全措施已被放松。
播客谈及了令人不安的核扩散前景。虽然没有证实新的核计划，但法国（向欧洲提供核保护伞）、日本和韩国等国对此兴趣日益浓厚，它们从乌克兰和伊朗等冲突中得出结论，认为核武器可以威慑侵略。Gerry和Becca警告说，将人工智能整合到核武库中，可能会危险地加速决策过程，缩短冷战时期曾阻止事故发生的人类深思熟虑环节，从而可能导致灾难性错误。
最后，专家小组承认，大部分国防开支不可避免地会浪费在失败的技术上（例如“星球大战”计划或特朗普的“金色穹顶”概念）。然而，他们也认为，高额国防预算最终的、尽管有些反常的激励作用是威慑战争本身，这与冷战时期大规模核武库阻止了直接冲突的情况如出一辙。Stephanie Flanders总结道，对北约等集体安全安排的信心，历史上曾以低得多的成本提供了安全感。
The latest episode of Bloomberg's Trumponomics podcast, hosted by Stephanie Flanders, delves into the escalating global arms race, spurred by shifting geopolitical dynamics and technological advancements. Featuring defense experts Becca Wasser (Bloomberg Economics) and Gerry Doyle (Global Defence Editor for Bloomberg News), the discussion highlights how Donald Trump's pressure on NATO and the conflict in Ukraine are reshaping global defense spending and priorities.
The podcast opens with the context of NATO leaders, including Donald Trump, meeting in Turkey. A key focus of these summits, especially under Trump, has been the "reasonable refrain" from the US that European nations need to increase their defense spending to confront risks at their borders and reduce reliance on the American security blanket. This pressure, combined with the Russian invasion of Ukraine, has catalyzed a worldwide surge in military investment, marking a new arms race that differs significantly from the Cold War era.
Gerry Doyle explains that the urgency for increased defense spending, initially focused on traditional battlefield assets like tanks, planes, and artillery, has now evolved. The current race is less about nuclear megatonnage and more about gaining subtle advantages through next-generation technologies. These include drones for offense, defense, and surveillance; the militarization of space to protect satellites and enhance military capabilities; and hypersonic weapons that can maneuver at extreme speeds to evade defenses. The ongoing conflicts in Ukraine and Iran are already demonstrating the practical application and transformative power of drones and AI on the battlefield.
Becca Wasser adds that this technological pursuit aims for three key advantages:
1. **Decision Advantage:** Who can make decisions faster through AI-enabled technologies.
2. **Mass:** Who can field more assets, like low-cost drones and missiles, to overwhelm adversaries.
3. **Cost Efficiency:** Achieving the best effect for the cheapest outlay, which often leads countries with manpower or fiscal constraints to invest heavily in drones and AI.
However, the experts caution that while drones offer a "bang for your buck," they are not a complete solution. Social media often distorts their effectiveness, showing successful strikes without revealing the many attempts that fail or the pre-existing vulnerabilities of targets. They are an additional tool, not a full replacement for high-end weaponry.
The conversation touches on a perceived paradox: drones are seen as cheap, leveling technology, yet the overall arms race involves immense, cutting-edge, and expensive R&D. Gerry notes that while drones and AI can empower smaller, resource-constrained nations to achieve 80% of high-end capabilities for much less, deep-pocketed countries like the US and China still hold an advantage in terms of massive production, R&D, and the ability to combine these new technologies with existing advanced systems.
Quantifying the spending, the US defense budget request alone is $1.5 trillion, roughly 3.4% of its GDP – lower than Cold War peaks but significantly higher than recent years. Europe is also aiming for 3.5% of GDP on defense by 2030 or 2035, but current projections suggest many countries will undershoot this, often by taking on significant debt. Globally, the figure stands at approximately $2 trillion across three continents.
Regarding economic impact, the consensus is that the economic dividend from defense spending, in terms of jobs and manufacturing, is often less than other types of infrastructure investment. For Europe, growing a domestic defense sector is crucial to avoid simply importing US hardware. However, Europe's defense industry is highly fragmented, with individual countries prioritizing their own national champions. Collective action and coordination are essential for developing strategic assets like space-based infrastructure, air defense, and transport aircraft, but political realities make "picking winners and losers" difficult, as each nation wants defense spending to benefit its local economy.
The integration of government and the tech sector, particularly in AI, is also discussed. China's "civil-military fusion" approach gives it an advantage in translating technological breakthroughs into military applications, unlike the fragmented decision-making in Western nations. While AI can offer benign applications like optimizing logistics, concerns mount over its use in accelerating targeting processes (as seen in the Iran war with Palantir's Maven system) and, most critically, its potential integration into nuclear command and control. Becca emphasizes the need for human decision-making in such critical areas, though some guardrails have been relaxed.
The podcast addresses the unsettling prospect of nuclear proliferation. While no new programs are confirmed, there's growing interest from countries like France (offering a nuclear umbrella to Europe), Japan, and South Korea, who observe conflicts like Ukraine and Iran and conclude that nuclear weapons deter aggression. Gerry and Becca warn that integrating AI into nuclear arsenals could dangerously speed up decision-making, potentially leading to catastrophic errors by shortening the human element of deliberation that prevented incidents during the Cold War.
Finally, the panel acknowledges that much defense spending inevitably goes to waste on failed technologies (recalling "Star Wars" or Trump's "Golden Dome" concept). However, they also argue that the ultimate, albeit perverse, incentive of high defense budgets is to deter war itself, drawing a parallel to the Cold War where massive nuclear stockpiles prevented direct conflict. Stephanie Flanders concludes by noting that confidence in collective security arrangements like NATO historically provided a sense of safety at a much lower cost.
摘要
A new, $2 trillion global arms race is underway — but this time it's being driven by artificial intelligence, drones and hypersonic weapons. Stephanie Flanders is joined by Becca Wasser, a geo-economics analyst with Bloomberg Economics, and Gerry Doyle, a senior editor for Bloomberg News, to explore how rising defense spending could reshape economies, redefine warfare and alter the future of global security.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.
GPT-4正在为你翻译摘要中......
中英文字稿 
《彭博周末播客》。新闻、分析，以及彭博的一些轻松内容。节目中包括我们的每周新闻问答。美泰公司报告说，由于哪种玩具车品牌的需求，第一季度的收入超出预期？风火轮。风火轮。是的，还是风火轮！这些东西还在流行吗？孩子们小的时候，我踩到过很多这样的玩具车，光脚踩上去真的很痛。《彭博周末播客》。今天就可以在 Apple、Spotify 或其他您常用的平台上订阅收听。
▶ 英文原文 ⏱
The Bloomberg This Weekend Podcast. News, analysis, and the lighter side of Bloomberg. Including our weekly news quiz. Mattel reported higher than expected first quarter revenue thanks to the demand for which toy car brand? Hot Wheels. Hot Wheels. Hot Wheels, yes! Are those still things? I've stepped on many of those with my children when they were young. They hurt very much on bare feet. The Bloomberg This Weekend Podcast. Subscribe today on Apple, Spotify, or wherever you listen.
彭博音频工作室。播客、广播、新闻。我是Stephanie Flanders，彭博的政府与经济负责人。这是“特朗普经济学”播客，带你了解唐纳德·特朗普的经济世界。他如何已经开始搅动全球经济，以及接下来可能会发生什么。本周，我们看到北约领导人，包括唐纳德·特朗普，将齐聚土耳其，参加可能是该联盟最具影响力的峰会之一。
▶ 英文原文 ⏱
Bloomberg Audio Studios. Podcasts, radio, news. I'm Stephanie Flanders, Head of Government and Economics at Bloomberg. And this is Trumponomics, the podcast that looks at the economic world of Donald Trump. How he's already shaking up the global economy and what on earth is going to happen next. This week we have NATO leaders, Donald Trump among them, gathering in Turkey for what could be one of the alliance's more consequential summits.
我在美国时间周二早上录制这段内容时，唐纳德·特朗普总统已经抵达安卡拉。他预计将在那里会见土耳其总统和其他领导人。最近，尤其是在特朗普总统任内，这些会议的重点往往是经济问题。美国一直以来合理且不断重复的诉求是：欧洲需要在应对边境风险方面增加开支，而不应该仅依赖美国提供的安全保障。
▶ 英文原文 ⏱
I'm recording on Tuesday morning, US time, and President Donald Trump has already arrived in Ankara. He's expected to meet with the Turkish president there and other leaders. And the focus of these meetings recently, particularly under President Trump, has tended to be money. The constant and reasonable refrain from the US being that Europe needs to spend more on confronting the risks at their borders and shouldn't continue to rely only on the security blanket of the US.
不仅仅是北约，全球范围内的国防开支都在增加，形成了一场新的全球军备竞赛，这次的军备竞赛可能与上一次看起来和感觉上都很不同。自冷战以来，许多国家首次试图获取核武器，或者至少让外界觉得他们有这样的意图。而之前限制核武器扩散的制约因素基本上已经消失了。
▶ 英文原文 ⏱
But it's not just NATO. Defence spending is ramping up all over the world in a new global arms race that could look and feel very different from the last one. For the first time since the Cold War, many countries are aiming to acquire nuclear weapons or at least look like they might want to. And the guardrails previously constraining that proliferation have more or less fallen away.
我们也清楚地看到无人机和人工智能如何在乌克兰和伊朗改变了战场。而这促使各国争相研制下一代高超音速武器等技术。因此，我认为这不仅对未来战争的进行方式提出了重大疑问，而且由于牵涉的金额巨大，也可能对我们经济的某些部分产生影响。
▶ 英文原文 ⏱
We're also seeing very dramatically how drones and AI have transformed the battlefield in Ukraine and Iran. And that has countries trying to beat their rivals to the next generation of hypersonic weapons and other things. So all of this, I think, could raise big questions, not just about the conduct of future wars, but also given the amounts involved, shape parts of our economy.
那么，这场新的军备竞赛有哪些关键特征？如果各国政府接连将军事技术作为最大投资重点之一，这对全球经济意味着什么呢？Becca Wasser 是彭博经济的国防负责人。此前，她曾在新美国安全中心和兰德公司为美国国防部主导研究和战争推演。Becca 还曾是国防战略国会委任委员会的工作人员。Becca，欢迎回到特朗普经济学。是的，谢谢邀请我。
▶ 英文原文 ⏱
So what are the key features of this new arms race and what's it going to mean for the global economy if governments, one after the other, make military tech one of their biggest investment priorities? Becca Wasser is the defence lead for Bloomberg Economics. Previously, she led studies and war games for the US Department of Defence at the Centre for a New American Security and at the RAND Corporation. Becca's also been a staff member on a congressionally appointed committee on the National Defence Strategy. Becca, welcome back to Trumponomics. Yeah, thanks for having me.
Gerry Doyle是彭博新闻全球防务的编辑。Gerry，谢谢你的到来。谢谢邀请我。Gerry，能告诉我们，人们或者政府现在在购买什么，而为什么现在有这么多的交易发生呢？其实，当前对防务技术的投资，很大程度上是从俄罗斯侵略乌克兰开始的。这使得形势变得紧迫，不仅在欧洲，而是在全球范围内，各国迅速意识到自冷战结束以来，他们可能在这方面的投入不足。
▶ 英文原文 ⏱
And Gerry Doyle is Global Defence Editor on the news side for Bloomberg News. Gerry, thanks for coming. Thanks for having me. Gerry, just tell us, what are people buying or what are governments buying and why is so much of it happening right now? Well, so much of this investment in defence technology kind of started with the Russian invasion of Ukraine. That sort of lent urgency to the whole situation, not just in Europe, but globally, as countries started to quickly realise that they might have underinvested since the end of the Cold War.
这导致许多国家开始大量购买你通常期望在战场上见到的传统装备，比如坦克、飞机、导弹、火炮等，这些曾是重大优先事项。而现在我们已逐步超越了这些，开始关注未来战场上将占据主导地位的技术。在冷战期间的几十年里，这种军备竞赛的体现主要是核武器，不仅仅是在库存规模上的竞争，还有在投送核武器的新奇方式和不同效果的研究上。
▶ 英文原文 ⏱
So that led a lot of countries to start buying a lot of the traditional things that you expect to see on a battlefield. The tanks, the planes, missiles, artillery was a huge priority. And now we've sort of moved past that and started to look at what is going to be the technology that's going to dominate the future battlefield. For decades during the Cold War, you saw that manifest itself, that arms race manifest itself in terms of nuclear weapons, not just the total stockpile sizes, but, you know, strange novel ways of delivering them, different effects that you can create with nuclear weapons.
当前我们看到的这场军备竞赛并不是为了能够向一座城市投放数百万吨的毁灭性武器，而是以一种更微妙的方式进行。各国试图通过未来的投资、开发无人机用于不同用途、进行防御、进攻和监视、太空军事化等手段来获取优势。他们还在研究如何保护轨道上的卫星，以及通过在太空部署的手段来提升军事优势。
▶ 英文原文 ⏱
And this current arms race that we're seeing right now is not about that, it's not about, you know, being able to deliver megatons worth of death onto a city. It's sort of more subtle as trying to find ways to give yourself an advantage in the future, doing things like investment, drones for different types of things, for defense, for offense, for surveillance, the militarization of space, trying to figure out ways to protect your satellites in orbit, trying to find ways to give your military an advantage with the things that you place in orbit.
然后是高超音速武器，这类武器可以算作更传统的破坏手段，但其新颖之处在于能够以极高的速度进行机动，避开防空系统等等。我们已经在当前的战场上看到这些武器和无人机的实际应用。现在的目标是弄清楚如何改进这些技术，并找到在大规模上应用它们的方法。
▶ 英文原文 ⏱
And then hypersonic weapons, which are sort of a more traditional means of destruction, but with a novel twist of being able to maneuver at extremely high speeds, avoid air defenses, and so on. And we've seen that and we've seen the drones sort of in practice happening on battlefields right now. And it's about trying to figure out a way to refine that, trying to figure out ways to improve and apply these things on a large scale.
我认为 Jerry Rays 是一个非常有趣的事物，它利用所有这些技术来获得优势。但这具体看起来是怎样的呢？我觉得这里有几个方面。首先是决策优势。谁能够更快做出决策，从而抢占先机？这就是人工智能支持的技术可以发挥作用的地方。另外还有数量上的优势。谁能够在任何时候投入更多的力量到战场上，以压倒性优势突破防线，压制对手？
▶ 英文原文 ⏱
I think Jerry Rays is something that's really interesting, and it's using all of these technologies to gain an advantage. But what does that look like? And I think here there's a few things. There's the decision advantage. Who can make decisions faster and therefore gain the initiative? And that's where things like AI-enabled technologies come in. But you also have this idea of mass. Who can put more on the battlefield at any given time to overwhelm defenses, to overwhelm your adversary?
这就是为什么你会看到低成本的无人机和更便宜的导弹的出现。我认为，最后一个优势领域就是成本这个概念。谁能用最低的成本做到？因此，一些传统武器系统，如高端导弹、高超音速武器和航天技术，都是非常昂贵的。这也是为什么许多国家政府和军队全力投入人工智能和无人机，因为他们认为这样能以最小的投入获得最大的效果。
▶ 英文原文 ⏱
And that's where you see things like low-cost drones and lower-cost missiles come in. And then I think the last area of advantage is this idea of cost. Who can do that cheapest? And that's where some of these more traditional weapon systems, these higher-end missiles, hypersonics, space, that's all very expensive. And that's why you see a lot of governments and a lot of militaries going all in on AI and all in on drones because they think that it can get them the best effect for the cheapest bang on the buck.
仅靠无人机本身，并不能解决所有问题。我认为有时我们确实看到许多军队，特别是那些受到人力限制的军队，比如乌克兰，或者那些财政紧张的国家，比如可能一些欧洲国家，全力投入使用无人机来弥补这些不足。无人机确实是一个有用的工具，但它们并不能完全替代很多高端武器。
▶ 英文原文 ⏱
But just on their own, drones aren't going to be the solution to all problems. And I think sometimes we do see a lot of militaries, particularly those that either have manpower constraints, like Ukraine, or those who have fiscal constraints, like arguably some countries in Europe, going all in on drones to try and make up for those shortfalls. It's absolutely true that drones are a useful tool, but they don't really fully replace a lot of the high-end weapons.
你提到用乌克兰常见的小型第一人称视角无人机摧毁坦克。在社交媒体上，我们看到的是无人机击中坦克，坦克爆炸的画面。但我们没有看到的是：之前可能有12到15架同样类型的无人机击中坦克却没有造成影响，或者只是在某种程度上损坏了坦克。此外，也许这辆坦克已经压到地雷，已经处于静止状态。所以，这些廉价武器带来的效果并不意味着它们取代了现有武器，而是成为了现有工具的一个补充。
▶ 英文原文 ⏱
You talk about destroying a tank with these tiny first-person view drones that you see in Ukraine. What we see in the social media is the drone hitting the tank and the tank blowing up. We don't see, like, the previous 12 to 15 first-person drones that hit the tank and did nothing or disabled it, or the fact that the tank had already run over a mine and was stationary, right? So the effects that we get from these cheap weapons aren't necessarily replacing what's there. They become an additional tool on top of what already exists.
我们会在稍后详细讨论其中的一些数字，以及它可能如何影响经济。不过，作为一个不像你们每天都在深入研究这些内容的人，我觉得我们常常听到两种说法，而且这两种说法感觉不能同时成立。一方面，至少在乌克兰战争初期，当人们开始了解无人机并且无人机在各个战场上变得更加重要时，我们感觉这似乎会是一项廉价的技术。
▶ 英文原文 ⏱
We'll get into some of the sort of numbers involved in a minute, and also, I think, the way it could shape economies. But as someone who's not as fully absorbing this stuff the way you both are every day, there seem to be those sort of two things that we get told, and it feels like they can't both be true. On the one hand, at least in the early stages of the Ukraine war and people learning about drones and drones becoming a much bigger element of all of these battlefields, we got the sense that it was going to be cheap.
正如你所说，Becky，你认为这将是物有所值的选择。但同样，可以明显感觉到，要充分利用这些技术以及开发其他各种类型武器所需的庞大技术量，这一切的成本并不会降低。如果有变化的话，那就是拥有雄厚财力的国家仍然在获取巨大的优势。这似乎存在不同的趋势。
▶ 英文原文 ⏱
And as, Becky, you say, you know, you think of it as going to be good, high, bang for your buck. But there's also this sense of the sheer amount of technology involved in getting the most out of them and also developing all these other kinds of arms suggests that, you know, none of this is getting cheaper. And if anything, it's still giving a massive advantage to the countries that have the deepest pockets. There seem to be different strands.
这段话大意是： 一方面，您在一些相关的内容中提到了人工智能以及其他现代技术创新是平等化的技术。比如，一个小国，比如乌克兰，就能够在技术上展现出超越其自身量级的实力。但是，另一方面，要在这些前沿技术上取得进展，规模仍然是非常重要的。
▶ 英文原文 ⏱
It's kind of on the one hand, you talk about it in some of your stuff about being a leveling technology, AI, and some of the other modern technology in innovation. You can have a country that's much smaller, Ukraine to Catholic example, kind of punch above its weight. But on the other hand, it does seem that scale is still incredibly important for being able to move ahead with these cutting-edge technologies.
我认为，可以公平地说，像中国或美国这样财力雄厚的国家，能够在某些方面做得更多。他们可以投入更多资源进行生产，投入更多资源进行研发等。然而，他们在增强本国军事力量方面的效果会有所降低，因为他们已经拥有其他能力，可以实现同样的效果，甚至效果更好。
▶ 英文原文 ⏱
And I think it's fair to say that a country with deeper pockets, like a China or the United States, would be able to do more with that. They would be able to put more resources into production, be able to put more resources into research and development and so on. But the effect that they're able to get in terms of magnifying the power of their own military is going to be diminished because they have all these other capabilities that kind of do the same thing or do it better.
因此，无人机和其他一些技术（你提到的人工智能也是一个很好的例子）让那些买不起高端设备的人有了更多的选择。他们可能买不起第六代战斗机群，也没有大量卫星在头顶飞行，更没有能够飞行数千英里的巡航导弹。但这些技术能够让他们以更少的资金完成80%的工作。
▶ 英文原文 ⏱
And so what drones and some of these other technologies, you mentioned AI is another good example. What they do is enable somebody who can't afford the high end, maybe, who can't afford a bunch of sixth-generation fighters, who doesn't have massive constellations of satellites overhead, who doesn't have cruise missiles that can fly thousands of miles. They're going to be able to do 80% of the things for a lot less money.
如果你是一个资源有限的国家或军队，那这样的取舍是值得的。我们应该了解一下相关的数字。我提到这些国家在全球范围内增加开支的时候，我指的是防务开支的增加有多大？如果我们只看美国的情况，美国今年的国防预算申请就达到了1.5万亿美元。这只是今年的数据，大约占国内生产总值的3.4%。对于美国来说，这实际上比冷战时期花费的GDP百分比要低，那时候的比例高得多。不过相比几年前，现在的比例又高了不少。
▶ 英文原文 ⏱
And if you are a resource-constrained country or military, that's a good trade-off. We should sort of get a sense of some of the numbers involved. When I talk about how those countries are ramping up spending around the world, I mean, what kind of numbers are we talking about for the increase in defense spending? Well, if you want to look at just the U.S. system alone, the U.S. defense budget request this year is $1.5 trillion. That's just for this year, and that amounts to roughly 3.4% of GDP spent on defense. For the U.S., that's actually sizably lower than what it had been spending in the Cold War, where it had a much higher percent of GDP. As a share of GDP. About a lot higher than it was a few years ago. Exactly.
我想，我的意思是，如果我们回到北约峰会的话题，国防开支将是讨论的重点。我们确实看到欧洲在努力实现到2030年和2035年，将国内生产总值（GDP）的3.5%用于核心国防开支的目标。根据彭博经济的研究显示，欧洲的一些主要国家可能达不到这个目标，而且为了达到3.5%的GDP比例，这个过程将是十分缓慢的。而且，这也将伴随着大量的债务。Jerry，据我了解，在全球范围内，仅在某些方面就需要2万亿美元，涉及三个大陆，这一数字与我们在冷战时期核武器扩张中所习惯的数字相差不大。
▶ 英文原文 ⏱
And I mean, I think, again, if we want to pull it back to the NATO summit, where defense spending is very much going to be the topic of conversation, you do see the ramp up in Europe to move toward that goal of 3.5% of GDP to be spent on core defense spending by 2035 and 2030. Some of the work that we've done at Bloomberg Economics show that, you know, the top countries in Europe are likely to undershoot that target and that it's going to be a very slow ramp up to get to 3.5% of GDP. And that's also going to come at a really high amount of taking on debt. Jerry, I think the figure that we had for the sort of global piece of this, at least on some aspects, was $2 trillion across three continents, which is, you know, not far off the sort of some of the numbers we're used to in relative terms for the Cold War nuclear buildups.
贝卡提到的研究告诉我们一个事实：关于任何一种经济红利，政府总是喜欢宣传说，我们的支出会带来更多就业机会和制造业发展，这听上去都很不错，只要能忽略军事开支部分。但实际来看，经济影响可能会比其他基础设施投资更小。特别是在欧洲，这很大程度上取决于他们能否发展本土的国防产业，否则他们可能只能大量进口美国的产品。那么他们在这方面的情况如何呢？从各个国家来看，欧洲的状况并不理想。很多国家虽有自己不同规模的国防企业，但通常都专注于某一个领域，比如制造航空电子设备、军舰、防空系统、坦克、炮弹、发动机等。
▶ 英文原文 ⏱
One thing we know from that research that Becca mentioned is that any kind of economic dividend, you know, governments like to talk about, well, we're spending more and it's going to produce jobs and manufacturing and it all sounds great if you can get past the military spending part. But when you actually look at how much economic impact there is, it's probably less than other kinds of infrastructure spending. And in Europe particularly, it's going to depend a lot on whether they can grow the domestic defense sector, because otherwise they're going to just be bringing in a lot of imports from the U.S. So how are they looking on that? Individually, European countries are not in a great position. Like many of them have a defense champion of various size, but usually there's a focus on one thing. They make avionics or they make ships or they make air defense systems, they make tanks, artillery shells, engines, something like that.
很少情况下，像德国或法国这样的国家会出现规模更大的公司，或者是多个公司组合在一起，以高水平完成许多事情，从而使它们具备非常发达的国防工业。然而，如果欧洲真正想在我们所讨论的全球军备竞赛中竞争，就必须采取集体行动。各国需要在生产什么武器、如何进行支出，以及优先事项等方面进行协调。目前，我们认为优先事项包括卫星和太空军事基础设施。另一个重要领域是空中防御。此外，还有一些虽然不那么引人注目但影响重大的项目，比如运输飞机或战略空运，它们让欧洲能够更加灵活地在大陆范围内调动坦克和人员。
▶ 英文原文 ⏱
Rarely, in a case sort of like Germany or France, you have even bigger companies or an assortment of companies that can do a lot of these things at a high level and sort of enable them to have a very well-developed defense industry. But in order for Europe to really compete in this global arms race that we're talking about, there has to be collective action. There has to be coordination about who's building what. There has to be coordination on spending. There has to be coordination on what the priorities are, which right now we see as being, again, satellites, like space-based military infrastructure. We see air defense as being another big one. And then there's sort of more boring but high-impact stuff like transport aircraft, like strategic airlift, we call it, being able to move tanks and people all around the continent pretty easily.
欧洲在这一方面并不具备很多资源，因此在一定程度上依赖美国提供的北约加油机来为空中飞行的飞机进行空中加油，从而延长飞行距离。这是他们很依赖美国的另一项资源。此外，空中警戒与控制能力也是美国拥有大量技术且历史上通过北约合作慷慨分享的领域，而欧洲现在也非常希望能够自行执行这项任务。我们看到欧洲宣布将购入10架萨博“全球眼”飞机，用作北约的空中警戒与控制机，以取代老旧的美国制造飞机。他们正在向这个方向努力，这对于多方面来说都很重要。
▶ 英文原文 ⏱
That's something that Europe doesn't have a lot of, and it kind of relies on the U.S. for a NATO tanker aircraft that refuel other planes in flight and extending their range. That's another thing they lean heavily on the U.S. for. And airborne warning and control, which is something that the U.S., again, has a lot of and historically has been sort of generous about sharing through its NATO partnerships, but that Europe is very interested in doing for themselves right now. And we saw that announced with the Saab Global Eye aircraft. They're going to buy 10 of those for NATO to be airborne warning and control planes that are going to replace the older American-made planes. So they're moving in that direction, and it's important for a lot of reasons.
目前，欧洲在国防支出方面以及将这些支出转化为真实能力和谁在生产这些能力方面，表现出高度分散的特点。欧洲的国防工业基础同样是分散的。最终，需要在国防领域中选择“赢家”和“输家”，但现在由于经济原因，这在政治上是不可接受的。因为每个国家都希望国防支出的增加能够回流到本国经济，回流到本地经济，从而使讨论不再停留在“枪支与黄油”的争论上。公平地说，在美国，涉及各州时，这种情况一直也是讨论的一部分。
▶ 英文原文 ⏱
Right now, Europe, in terms of defense spending, in terms of translating that into genuine capabilities and who's producing those capabilities, it's incredibly fragmented. And you have a fragmented defense industrial base across Europe. And eventually, there's going to need to be this requirement to pick winners and losers, but that is politically unpalatable right now because of the economics, because every single country wants to see that increase in defense spend go back to their own economy, go back to their local economies, and be able to have a conversation that's no longer sort of this like guns versus butter debate. But to be fair, that's always been an element of the U.S. debate as well when it comes to states.
每个人都希望拥有自己的安宁，这也导致美国的国防开支常常极其低效。令人难以置信的是，这些开支在某些地方特别集中，因为有些国会议员不断努力维护特定的军事系统，以便这些系统不会被削减，即便其实可能已经到了应该退役的时刻。这是因为这些系统能为他们的选区或所在州带来利益。Jerry 起初就和我们谈到了这一现象中的技术因素，以及其如何推动了这些投资。
▶ 英文原文 ⏱
Everybody wants their own peace, and that has also meant that often defense spending in the U.S. was incredibly inefficient. Incredibly, and very much, you know, concentrated in certain pockets where you had certain members of Congress who have continually fought for specific systems to not be cut when perhaps maybe it was time for them to retire because of the benefits that they brought to their district or their state. Jerry had sort of started off talking to us about the sort of tech piece of this and how that was driving some of these investments.
如果我们将这一点与我们刚刚的讨论结合起来，我的意思是，这确实表明如果各国政府在军事领域加大对研发的投入，这种趋势看起来可能会影响AI本身的未来，甚至是整个技术领域，尤其是在全球国防开支增加的情况下。我认为的确如此。你看像中国这样的国家，公共部门和私人部门之间，包括大学与政府之间都有着紧密的联系。
▶ 英文原文 ⏱
And if we sort of combine that with the discussion we've just had, I mean, it does suggest that if governments are going to be investing more in research and development in the military space that feels like even the future of AI itself or certainly whole areas of technology could be shaped by the fact that we're in a time of globally increasing defense spending. Yeah, I think so. And, you know, if you look at a country like China where there's this intense interweaving of the public and the private sector and, you know, the universities and the government.
是的，你谈到了军民融合。确实，在某种意义上，这给了中国一种优势，因为无论是在私人公司、研究型大学还是在某个偏远地区的实验室里发生的任何突破，最终都会落到中国政府手中，或者至少他们有机会评估这些成果，并决定其是否具有军事应用价值。这也同样适用于传统的国防建设。
▶ 英文原文 ⏱
Yeah, you talk about the civil-military fusion. Exactly, exactly, where, you know, in some sense that gives China an advantage because any breakthrough that happens, whether it's at a private company or a research university or, you know, in some, you know, random lab in the hinterlands, it will end up in the hands of the Chinese government or they will at least have the opportunity to evaluate it and decide whether that's going to be, you know, militarily applicable or not. That also translates into traditional defense build-outs as well.
你知道，如果中国政府决定需要更多的飞机，就不会出现那种争论，比如哪一个国会选区来建造这类问题，可以说机器就开始运转了。相比之下，欧洲的情况就不一样了。正如Becca所说，总会有摩擦，总会有关于谁是赢家、谁是输家的争议。我们看到了这点，比如F-CAS项目，本来是希望让欧洲两个最大的飞机公司——达索和空客——联合起来，制造第六代飞机。
▶ 英文原文 ⏱
You know, if the Chinese government decides that they need more aircraft, there's not really a fight over, you know, whose congressional district it gets built in or anything like that, you know, sort of the machine starts up. And then you compare and contrast that to the way Europe is set up, where, as Becca said, there's always going to be friction about, you know, who's going to be the winner, who's going to be the loser. We saw that, you know, F-CAS program, which was supposed to, you know, have the two largest aircraft companies in Europe, like the Seoul and Airbus, were going to combine forces and make this six-generation plane.
我们看到合作未果，因为这两家公司无法好好合作。而这种情况在中国并不常见。因此在这方面，中国可能在推动创新方面具有一定优势。Becca，说到政府与科技行业的紧密联系，我想起这一点。最近我们也看到了Anthropic与五角大楼的合作。许多人担心，最大的科技公司和大量的资金正在投入到人工智能的军事应用而不是其他领域。
▶ 英文原文 ⏱
We saw that fall apart because the two companies couldn't get along. And that's not something really that happens in China. So to that extent, they might have an advantage in the way they move this sort of innovation forward. Becca, I'm sort of harking back on this point about the closer connection between the government and the tech sector. I mean, I guess we saw that most recently with that between Anthropic and the Pentagon. A lot of people will be concerned that the biggest tech firms who are right at the forefront of this and the biggest amounts of money are going into the military applications of AI rather than other things.
这是否意味着，我们应该担心这会影响AI的未来发展？我的意思是，我们确实应该担心AI将如何更广泛地融入军事领域。有一些应用是很无害的。其中一个我从美国军方听到最多的就是试图利用AI加速它的物流建模过程，也就是从一个地方将物资运送到另一个地方的方法。在我看来，这是一个无害的应用方式。
▶ 英文原文 ⏱
Is that, I mean, should we be worried that that's just going to shape the future of AI? I mean, we should be worried about, you know, how AI is going to be integrated into the military more broadly. There are some very benign applications. One of the ones that I've heard the most from the U.S. military is trying to use AI to speed up, essentially, its modeling for how it gets logistics from one place to another, right? That's a, to me, that's a benign way.
好的，我们来加快一些流程的速度吧。比如说，以前人们需要花费大量时间手工输入数据到电子表格中，就像1999年那样，现在我们应该考虑如何更好地运用这些方法。这样做的同时，我们也需要注意，可能会有一些负面影响的情况。传统上，五角大楼对这种情况设有一定的防护措施，而这些防护措施在特朗普政府时期有一些放松。因此，我们看到在战场上，特别是在伊朗战争中，大量使用了人工智能工具，尤其是Palantir公司的Maven智能系统，以加速某些目标定位过程，获得许多军队想要的决策优势。
▶ 英文原文 ⏱
Like, okay, let's speed up processes. Let's speed up things that take tons of hours of people just, you know, hand-jamming things into a spreadsheet like it's 1999. Instead, you know, trying to think about the ways in which you can have good use cases, but you could also equally have some negative use cases. And traditionally, the Pentagon has put some guardrails. Some of those guardrails have actually been relaxed by the Trump administration. So now we've seen in places on the battlefield, specifically in the Iran war, where there's been heavy use of AI tools, particularly Palantir's Maven smart system, to try and speed up some of the targeting processes to get that decision-making advantage that so many militaries want.
这让美国以及其他国家的军队处于一个潜在的棘手境地。这并不是说没有防范措施来限制将人工智能用于一些最危险的事情。我认为，对于将人工智能整合进核武器指挥和控制的做法，人们进行了很多反对，这是非常合理的。基本上，这涉及到人工智能能否帮助决定是否使用核武器。对我来说，这应该完全是人类的决策过程。
▶ 英文原文 ⏱
You know, that puts the U.S. and, frankly, other militaries on a potentially tricky slope. That's not to say that there are not guardrails against using AI for some of the most dangerous things. I think there's a lot of pushback, and rightfully so, on the integration of AI into nuclear command and control. So essentially, whether AI can help make decisions about the use or non-use of nuclear weapons. To me, that should be very much a human decision-making process.
Geri，我之前提到过核问题。最近世界的变化可能让一些国家认为他们有必要获取核武器。据说，目前世界上只有九个核武器国家。但我们是否真的看到有更多国家有意愿发展核武器？而这是否可能与我们之前关于人工智能的讨论有一种令人担忧的重合呢？在国防领域，总是存在令人担忧的重合的可能性。而具体到核武器，据我们所知，目前没有没有核武器的国家主动启动了核武器研发计划。
▶ 英文原文 ⏱
Geri, I started mentioning about the nuclear piece. Countries might have concluded from the way the world has gone recently that actually they have an interest in acquiring nuclear weapons. Supposedly, we only have nine nuclear powers currently in the world. But are we actually seeing countries developing an increase in the number of countries wanting to develop? And is there a potential and rather frightening overlap with our previous conversation about AI? In the defense world, there's always a possibility of frightening overlap. It's frightening overlap all the way down. But looking at nuclear weapons specifically, as far as we know, nobody who doesn't currently have nuclear weapons has actively spun up a program to create them.
我们看到欧洲国家对更加深入地参与现有核项目表现出了兴趣，特别是法国的项目。马克龙已经以非常直白的方式表示，法国希望扩充其核武库，并希望为欧洲其他国家提供核保护伞，因为他觉得美国在这方面的承诺有所减少。同时，我们也注意到在亚洲，日本和韩国公开讨论获得核武器。根据我们目前的了解，这些计划还没有开始实施，也没有任何官方政府决定推进这些计划。但这些公开讨论就已足以说明问题的严重性，对吧？
▶ 英文原文 ⏱
What we have seen is an expression of interest from European countries about getting more deeply involved with existing nuclear programs, specifically France's. Macron has spoken, you know, sort of in very plain terms about France wanting to expand its arsenal, wanting to offer a nuclear umbrella to the rest of Europe to sort of replace what he sees as, you know, the U.S. pulling back from its commitments there. We also see in Asia sort of open conversations in Japan and South Korea about acquiring nuclear weapons. That work hasn't started yet, as far as we've known. And there hasn't been any official government decision to move that forward. But the fact that those conversations are happening in the open says that it's real, right?
这种渴望和恐惧是存在的。没有人想被落下。当你看到乌克兰和伊朗这样的地方发生的事情时，最简单的推论就是，如果那些国家拥有核武器，比如像朝鲜那样，这些事情就不会发生。这话一点没错。正如贝卡所说的，将新兴技术应用于核武库，比如人工智能，这是一个令人担忧的问题。目前，所有拥有核武器的国家都非常清楚，将人工智能与核库存联系在一起可能带来的问题。
▶ 英文原文 ⏱
That desire, that fear is there. Nobody wants to get left behind. And when you see what's happened in places like Ukraine and Iran, the easiest equation to apply to that is, well, you know, if those countries had had nuclear weapons. Like North Korea. This wouldn't have happened. That's exactly right. And as Becca said, further applying, you know, developing technologies to nuclear arsenal, things like artificial intelligence, that is a concern and it's something to be worried about. I think at this point, everybody who has nuclear weapons is extremely aware of the problems that they could come from linking artificial intelligence to nuclear stockpiles.
当我在新加坡参加香格里拉对话时，中国人民解放军和巴基斯坦军方的高级将领们公开谈到了他们对人工智能的担忧。他们的担心并不是人工智能会真的以某种方式接管一切，而是使用人工智能的工具会加快决策过程，快到人们可能会失去冷静。比如说，原本应对核打击可能有20分钟或10分钟的反应时间，但由于 AI 提供的回应建议等一切变得极其迅速，可能导致某人做出仓促的决定，反而让情况变得更糟而不是更好。
▶ 英文原文 ⏱
When I was in Singapore for the Shangri-La Dialogue, the high-ranking generals in both the People's Liberation Army, China, and Pakistan's military sort of spoke openly about this, that their fear of AI was not that it would sort of, you know, take over in sort of an actual artificial intelligence way, but that tools using AI would speed up decision-making processes to the point where people would sort of lose their cool, essentially. You know, they would think, you know, instead of having 20 minutes to respond to a nuclear attack or 10 minutes or something, everything would move so fast with, you know, recommendations for responses and things like that, that somebody would make a vast decision and things would get worse instead of better.
所以，我认为，各个国家普遍希望对这类事情施加某种限制措施。当然，我们在冷战时期就有过这样的例子，比如机器向某个飞行员传达信息，说这是一次核攻击。至少当时还可以用几分钟来思考这是否真实，而不是几秒钟。最终，这仍需要人类来做出下一步行动的决定。过去，各国的国防部门在大谈即将到来的新科技时，总是充满信心，比如“星球大战”计划。
▶ 英文原文 ⏱
So those are the kind of guardrails, I think, that broadly countries are looking to apply to that sort of thing. And of course, we did have examples in the Cold War of that, you know, where the machine is telling an individual pilot or whatever, this is a nuclear attack. And at least there were minutes there as opposed to seconds for them to think, is this realistic? And it relied on humans, ultimately, to make the decision about what to do next. In the past, defense departments have been very good at talking a good game about fantastic new technologies that were coming down the track. We had Star Wars.
现在我们已经看到，贝克做了非常精细的成本核算，涉及所谓的黄金穹顶计划，也就是特朗普提到的覆盖整个美国的项目，结果发现这个数字非常庞大，并且其中有相当多的资金被浪费了。他们口头上说得很好，但实际上并没有实现目标。是不是这些钱很大一部分都会被浪费呢？我的意思是，会的。但很难说具体有多少，因为有时候技术会成功，比如你想去月球，结果成功了。但有时候，比如你想建造轨道核防御系统，却失败了。
▶ 英文原文 ⏱
Now we've had, I mean, Becker has done some very elaborate costing where the numbers get very large for the so-called Golden Dome that Donald Trump has talked about for the whole of the U.S. And an awful lot of that money has been wasted. They talked good game, but didn't really pan out. Is an awful lot of this money just going to be wasted? I mean, yes. It's hard to say how much, though, because sometimes technology pans out. Sometimes you set out to go to the moon and you do it. But other times, you know, you set out to build orbital nuclear defenses and it just doesn't work.
你花费了成百上千亿美元，但什么都没能送入轨道，什么都不见成效。然后你放弃了，离开了。30年后，你又开始尝试，这正是我们现在所做的。当然，金穹是否能达到宣传的效果，或者为其开发的技术是否会成为现实以及对其他经济领域有用，还有待观察。因为人们总是说这会有技术溢出效应，这的确是事实。
▶ 英文原文 ⏱
You spend, you know, hundreds and hundreds of billions of dollars on it and nothing gets in orbit and nothing works. And then you give up and walk away. And then you try again 30 years later, which is what we're doing right now. Of course, that remains to be seen whether Golden Dome is going to be what it is being pitched as being or whether any of the technology being developed for it will become real. Or useful for the rest of the economy, because that's the other thing that is always said is the technological spillovers. That's true.
我的意思是，这些技术大多都非常专注于某一个领域。很难想象在我家后院里会有什么高能激光的应用，尽管我非常希望能有一个。因为这些技术主要应用于航空航天，花费巨大却创造不了多少就业机会，也没有太多民用应用。是的，完全正确。所以，这些技术的未来发展尚待观察。我认为某些技术将会成为现实并可能被用于武器系统，其中一些会进入美国、中国、欧洲及其他国家的武器库，还有一些可能会有民用应用。但我估计有很大一部分，应该说不到一半，会没有实际用途。这就是开发国防技术的本质吧。我想，最终如果我们永远不知道这些技术是否真的有效，对人类来说可能是件好事。我愿意支持这样的结果。
▶ 英文原文 ⏱
I mean, a lot of this stuff is fairly narrowly focused. It's hard to see, you know, what an application for, you know, a high energy laser would be, you know, in my backyard. As much as I'd love to have one. You know, aerospace-based. Because it's loads of money at not very many jobs and not very many civilian applications. Yeah, I mean, exactly. Exactly. So, you know, it remains to be seen. I think some of that will become real and weaponized. And some of it will find its way into the arsenals of the U.S. and China and Europe and other countries. And some of it will end up having civilian applications. But some large percentage of it, less than half, I would say, will just be on dead ends. And that's just kind of the nature of the game when it comes to developing defense technology. I guess in the end, if we never found out whether it worked or not, might even be a good outcome for humanity. I'd sign up for that.
好的。我想，我不知道这是否是个正面的结论，但我们认为这对经济不太好，可能也不起作用。不过至少它很花钱。用这种方式来看待它，听起来并不怎么好，是吧？但你知道什么也很贵吗？战争。战争很昂贵。最终，很多武器不仅仅是为了发动战争，而是为了防止战争的发生。因此，是的，这几乎是一种反常的激励机制，你会看到防务预算很高，看到很多钱浪费在不起作用的导弹技术上，但这些技术可能会在另一种有效的应用中被使用。但归根结底，这一切都是为了让国家感到安全和受到保护，从而阻止侵略发生，以免我们陷入可能耗费数万亿美元的灾难性战争。
▶ 英文原文 ⏱
All right. So, I guess, I don't know if it's positive or not that we concluded that it's not very good for the economy and may not work. But at least it costs a lot of money. When you put it that way, it doesn't sound great, does it? But do you want to know what also is expensive? War. War is expensive. And ultimately, so much of these weapons is not just about this idea of prosecuting war. It's to actually deter war from happening in the first place. And so, yes, there's almost this perverse incentive where you do see high defense budgets. You see a lot of money being wasted on, say, a missile technology that doesn't work, only to be used later on in another application that does work. But ultimately, all of this is trying to make it so that countries feel safe and protected and can deter aggression from happening so we don't find ourselves in catastrophic war that can cost trillions and trillions of dollars.
如果你以冷战为例来看待这个问题，当时拥有的核武器数量和运载系统的规模是令人难以置信的，他们还想出了各种疯狂的方法来进行核战争。但最终，所有这些其实都是为了确保战争永远不会发生——这就是背后的理论。如果你相信这一点，那么冷战一结束，大量核武器库存随之消失也可以证明这一点。此外，当我们对像北约这样的集体安全安排有信心时，其实花费更少的钱也能让我们感到安全。不过，那是另一个话题了。
▶ 英文原文 ⏱
And just on top of that, if you look at the Cold War as an example, the absolute mind-boggling number of nuclear weapons there were and delivery systems and all just the crazy stuff that they came up with to conduct nuclear war. In the end, all of that served the purpose, if you sort of buy into the theory behind it, of making sure it never happened. You know, and I guess some of the proof in the pudding there is that as soon as the Cold War ended, a lot of those stockpiles just disappeared. Well, it strikes me we also felt secure for a lot less money when there was confidence in collective security arrangements like NATO. But that is another matter.
Becca和Geri，非常感谢你们。不客气。感谢收听来自彭博社的《特朗普经济学》。我是主持人斯蒂芬妮·弗兰德斯，参与节目的还有彭博经济学的国防负责人Becca Wasser和彭博新闻的全球国防编辑Gerry Doyle。《特朗普经济学》由Moses Andam和Sama Sadi制作，Amy Keene协助参与，Blake Maples和Kelly Gary负责音效设计。为了帮助更多人找到《特朗普经济学》，请在你收听的平台上积极评价和评论。
▶ 英文原文 ⏱
Becca and Geri, thank you so much. My pleasure. Thanks for listening to Trumponomics from Bloomberg. It was hosted by me, Stephanie Flanders, and I was joined by Becca Wasser, Defence Lead for Bloomberg Economics, and Gerry Doyle, Global Defence Editor for Bloomberg News. Trumponomics was produced by Moses Andam and Sama Sadi, with help from Amy Keene, and sound design by Blake Maples and Kelly Gary. To help others find Trumponomics, rate and review it highly wherever you listen.